History Soars at Pheonix  

CHAPTER I

Estimate of the Situation Prior to Outbreak of War

Progress of Revision of the Wartime Naval Organization from November 1940 until the Outbreak of War

 

LINK 1

Chart 1 shows how surface craft were replenished and how the Navy shifted into a wartime organization.

Estimate of the Situation in Early November 1941

 

On 1 November 1941, at the Liaison Conference between the Japanese Government and Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Minister

Shimada made the following statement:

In the event of war, the Naval High Command believes that the Navy stands a very good chance of victory in both the early stage operations and the interception operations against the enemy fleet, with the present power ratio. However, should the war continue into its third year and become a long term war, according to comprehensive research by the various Navy departments, shortages of war materials and the inadequacy of Japan's industrial potential will then begin to have their effect on the Navy's strength. Under the latter conditions, it would be difficult for us to have any measure of confidence that we could bring the war to a victorious conclusion.

On the other hand, if we decide to continue diplomatic negotiations and later fail to bring them to a successful conclusion, we will be forced to open hostilities at a great operational disadvantage, caused by the delay. Consequently, although there is e great risk in beginning the war now we must realize that there is also a great risk in depending upon negotiations unless we can be certain of the final outcome. It would seem, therefore, that whether we continue diplomatic negotiations or open hostilities, great risks and difficulties are involved. The risks involved in each case have to be weighed in order to arrive at an estimate of the general situation. The risks attendant upon the opening of hostilities are enormous and it must be realized that once committed we cannot

 

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Chart 1 152-01.doc
Changes of Organization Japanese Navy from November 1940 to the Outbreak of the war.

Pages 2-9

turn back; therefore, if at all possible, we should use diplomacy. However, if we are not confidant of the success of the diplomatic negotiations, then we have no alternative but to take up arms...

When we initiate hostilities against our powerful adversary, we must make our noble and just cause explicitly clear to our people and to the world at large. In conjunction with this, we must earnestly study the best methods of guiding our people in war.

 

On 4 November, at the Joint Army-Navy Supreme Military Council meeting [1], the gist of Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano's speech was as follows:

If we allow the present state of affairs to continue indefinitely, our Empire will not only ultimately lose its war potential but will be placed strategically at a great disadvantage. The Government is now earnestly striving to break the stalemate in the present crisis through diplomatic channels. We are heartily in accord with this. At the same time, however, we must be fully prepared should our Empire, with the failure of diplomatic negotiations, be forced to take up arms. It is the view of Imperial General Headquarters that Japan must continue all-out operational preparations and be ready for war in the event

 

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

[1] The Joint Army-Navy Supreme Military Council meeting was held on 4 November 1941, the day before the Imperial Conference was convoked. The Emperor had asked the Council whether it was advisable to proceed with war preparations as a military measure to meet the worst possible situation - namely, in the event negotiations with the United States failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion. The Council meeting held in the afternoon of 4 November was presided over by Field Marshal Prince Kanin and was honored by the presence of the Emperor. The agendum was "National defense and the use of arms in implementing the national policy of Imperial Japan," and the issue; "Japan, in order to free herself from the present crisis must take up arms against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands and thereby safeguard her national existence and security and establish a new order in Greater East Asia. The time to initiate military operations should be set for the beginning of December." After explanations, questions and various views were presented, the Council unanimously agreed that Japan should go to war.

 

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of such a failure. In my opinion, in the present situation, continuance of these operational preparations will serve to further the negotiations.

Should Japan's negotiations with the United States fail and war begin between Japan and the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands, I believe that, on the basis of the present strength of the operating forces in the Pacific, we have a good chance of defeating the enemy both in the first phase operations and in the interception operations against the enemy fleet, provided hostilities begin in early December. If we are successful in the first phase operations, we should be able to secure strategical key points in the southwest Pacific and thus be in a position to wage a long war of attrition. In a war against the United States and Great Britain, we have no sure way of bringing the enemy to his knees, so in all probability the war would be a protracted one. We must, therefore, be prepared for a long war both spiritually and materially. The outcome of a long war depends on various physical and metaphysical factors, on our total war potential and on the development of the world situation. It is difficult, under the circumstances, to foretell now whether we have a chance of winning the war several years hence.

 

It the Imperial Conference on 5 November, the Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama stated:

The armies in the southern territories are steadily being reinforced. Their present strengths are as follows:

 

Malaya 60-70,000 troops and about 320 planes. Philippines About 42,000 troops and about 170 planes. Dutch East Indies About 85,000 troops and about 300 planes. Burma About 35,000 troops and about 60 planes.

Compared with the forces in these territories before the outbreak of war in Europe, the Army in Malaya has increased about eight times, that in the Philippines about four times, that in the Dutch East Indies about two and a half times and that in Burma about five times. The total strength of the armies these territories amounts to a little more than 200,000; we must expect their rate of increase to become greater with time.

The ground forces in these territories as essentially native armies formed around a nucleus of white troops, which constitute about 30 per cent of the forces. They are not well trained and their combat ability is generally below standard, However, they

 

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are inured to tropical weather and climate. We must also remember that their planes perform well and their pilots are quite good.

From the operational standpoint, each day of delay in the commencement of military operations will place us at a greater disadvantage so that finally it will become impossible to conduct operations for the following reasons:

 

1. Japan will not be able to keep pace with the United States in an armament race, especially in aircraft production.

2. American defenses in the Philippines, as well as other American military preparations, will make rapid headway.

3. Defensive coordination of the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands and China will be further stepped-up and their combined defensive power in the southern area will be increased vastly.

4. If the war is delayed until spring, operational action the northern Pacific and Siberia would become possible. Japan then might be committed to fight on the northern and southern fronts at the same time.

 

In addition to the above, weather conditions in the anticipated theater of operations, which are a very important factor in the present operations plan, will not allow indefinite postponement of war. Therefore, in order to initiate our military operations immediately upon the completion of present operational preparations, I should like to set the time as early December.

The major part of the Army's initial operations in the southern areas will consist of landings against strongly defended distant enemy bases. These operations will have to be conducted in scorching heat, while repelling hostile submarines and airplane attacks. We must, therefore, except to have to surmount considerable difficulties. However, from the over-all standpoint, whereas the enemy forces will be scattered over wide areas separated from each other by sea, rendering it difficult for them to coordinate movements, we will be able to consolidate our forces in surprise attacks to destroy the enemy piecemeal. I am confident, therefore, that close coordination between the Army and the Navy will insure the success of our landing operations. In regard to the operations after the landing, comparing organization, equipment, the quality and the number of men of our forces and the enemy, I am confident that victory will be ours.

 

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After the conclusion of these operations, even if we did our best to terminate the war as early as possible by diplomatic and military means, especially through the exploitation of our naval successes, we probably would still have to be prepared for a long war. However, since we could capture enemy military and air bases and make our position invulnerable, I believe we could use various means to frustrate the enemy's intentions.

As to our defense against the Soviet Union and our China operations after we embark on the Southern Operations, we intend to hold generally our present military power which will enable us to strengthen our defenses against the Soviet Union and to continue our operations in China. I think we can exploit our successes in the Southern Operations so that they would help conclude the China Incident.

The Soviet field armies have suffered severe losses at the hands of the German Army, and the Soviet's munitions industries productive capacity, too, has decreased enormously. The Far Eastern Red Army, furthermore, has sent, since last spring, about 13 divisions of infantry, about 1,300 tanks and no less than 1,300 planes eastward to European Russia, and its fighting strength, I believe, is declining materially and spiritually. Therefore, as long as our Kwantung Army maintains a strong position there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union, on its own initiative, will attack us.

However, since there is the possibility that the United States might force the Soviet Union to allow the United States to build air and submarine bases in its far eastern territory as northern bases of attack against Japan, and the Soviet Union might not be in a position to reject the demand, we must expect hostile submarines and air action from the northern area. The above action, should it occur, could precipitate war between Japan and the Soviet Union. Since we cannot disregard this possibility altogether, we must conclude our Southern Operations as early as possible and be fully prepared to meet the above possibility.

In regard to the relation between military operations and diplomacy, to this day our operational preparations have been restricted, according to the decisions of the Imperial Conference of 6 September, so that they would not jeopardize diplomatic negotiations, but henceforth the preparations must be accelerated with the intention of making war and we must leave no stone unturned to develop our military strength to the fullest by the beginning of December. This action might provoke the United States and Britain, but I believe that such preparation will assist our

 

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diplomatic negotiations. Needless to say, we will cancel the use of force if our diplomacy should succeed before 2400 hours, 30 November. However, should diplomacy fail to achieve its end by this time, I believe we should , upon receiving Imperial assent, initiate our military operations before the chance is lost and do our utmost to attain our military objective.

Comparison of Japanese and Estimated Allied Strength in the Pacific Immediately Prior to the War

 

Allied Naval Strength

The following is the estimated naval strength of the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in the Pacific areas at the end of November 1941.

United States Fleet (the Pacific area)

Battleships ......................... 11

Aircraft carriers ................... 5

Heavy cruisers ...................... 16

Light cruisers ...................... 14

Destroyers .......................... 84

Submarines .......................... 30

Total ............................ 160; 911,575 tons

Others ........................... 52; 301,800 tons

Grand total ...................... 212; 1,213,375 tons

 

U. S. Naval Vessels in Central and South America

Destroyers .......................... 2; 2,180 tons

Others .............................. 2; 4,000 tons

Total ........................... 4; 6,180 tons

 

U. S. Far East Fleet

Heavy cruiser ....................... 1

Light cruiser ....................... 1

Destroyer ........................... 14

Submarines .......................... 17

Others .............................. 17; 42,300 tons

 

14

 

The Soviet Far East Fleet

Destroyers .......................... 2

Submarines .......................... more than 60

Total ............................ more than 62; 30,00 tons

Others ........................... undetermined number

 

Australian Navy

Heavy cruiser ....................... 1

Light cruiser ....................... 1

Destroyer ........................... 5

Others .............................. 7; 7,246 tons

 

New Zealand Navy

Light cruiser ....................... 2; 4,170 tons

Others .............................. 3; approximately 2,120 tons

 

British Asiatic Fleet

Battleships ......................... 1

Light cruisers ...................... 4

Destroyers .......................... 4

Submarines .......................... 15

Others .............................. 26; 37,101 tons

 

Royal Netherlands Fleet

Cruisers ............................ 5

Destroyers .......................... 8

Submarines .......................... 19

 

British East Indies Fleet

Heavy cruiser ....................... 3; 9,580 tons

Aircraft carriers ................... 2

Destroyer ........................... 8

 

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Chart 2-a 152-02.doc
Estimated American, British and Dutch Air and Land Strengths Prior to Pacific War

 

Page 16-17

 

Chart 3 152-03.doc
Comparison of Naval Strength of Japan and the United States Pacific and Asiatic Fleets at the Beginning of December, 1941

 

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An estimate of Japanese and United States' naval strength and anticipated changes thereto, is given hereunder:

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Japanese Navy estimated the United States' 10 to Japan's 7 or thereabouts as the ratio of the vessels possessed by the United States and the Japanese navies. However, at the war's beginning, considering the fact that Japan possessed 14 obsolete vessels totaling about 60,000 tons (which included the Fuji, the Kitagami and several submarines) while the United States must have had far more useless vessels which were not properly equipped for war, the Japanese Navy judged that the ratio of vessels actually capable of action on the sea was about 10 (United States) to 7.5 (Japan). The United States air strength capable of participating in naval operations was estimated at some 5,500 naval planes plus 100 army strategic bombers. Against this, Japanese Navy operational aircraft totaled 3,300, of which 1,699 were incorporated into the Combined Fleet to participate in offensive operations. Since American air strength was widely dispersed, the strength which the United States could immediately use against Japan was estimated at not more than 2,600, even when both army and Navy planes were taken into consideration. The Japanese Navy, therefore, expected that, if the Japanese Army air strength was taken into consideration, the air battle in the initial stage would be in favor of Japan.

Next, the Japanese Navy estimated the changes in naval strength ratio between Japan and the United States for 1942 and after as follows:

 

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according to the then existing Japanese Navy's armament plan, the naval forces were to be increased by about 390,000 tons (130,000 tons a year) by the end of 1944. In addition, vessels completed by wartime emergency shipbuilding based upon the War Preparation Plan and the Fifth Armament Replenishment Program which was expected to be started in the near future, should be taken into consideration.

It was, however, believed that it would be difficult to build 200,000 tons a year. If Japan succeeded in concentrating the entire productive resources of the country for shipbuilding at the same time the war was begun, it was thought it might be possible to build even more vessels than the 200,000 tons a year. If the national resources namely, financial, material, technical resources and industrial capacity of the nation - were taken into account, 300,000 tons was considered the maximum that could be achieved.

On the other hand, the United States shipbuilding capacity was estimated at well over three times that of Japan. Furthermore, should the United States convert many of her merchant vessels into combat ships (above estimate of Japan's shipbuilding capacity included such conversion of merchant ships) and mass produce ships, it was believed that the United States could build five to six times as many ships as Japan without much difficulty. Moreover, on the basis of vessels under construction or in the planning stage at the end of 1941, the United States had more than 1,900,000 tons of ships against lass than 320,000 tons in Japan. The Japanese Navy, therefore, was forced to

 

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conclude that Japan's ratio of naval strength against the United States would, even when viewed most optimistically, be 50 per cent or thereabouts in 1943 and 30 per cent or even less in 1944.

The estimate of the productive capacity of aircraft in Japan and in the United States was as follows:

               Japan (Navy only)               United States [2]  

1942          4,000 planes                   47,900 planes

1943           8,000 "                             85,000 "

1944           12,000 "                          more than 100,000 "

Therefore, the United States' capacity was more than 10 times that of Japan. Japan expected Army plane production to be about equal to the Navy's but it was almost impossible to use the Army air strength in sea operations against the United States due to training and technical and performance differences existing in the army and Navy air forces. Thus, even when aircraft available to the United States in the Pacific was scaled down to about 70 per cent of all manufactured be cause of the extended United States supply line and the necessity for supply to other theaters, the United States was estimated to have an aircraft replenishment capacity seven to eight times as large as Japan.

 

 

[2] United States planes included both Army and Navy. However, this was an estimate of air strength that could operate over the water. United States Army planes could operate over water, whereas, at this time, Japanese Army planes could be used only over land.

 

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Such being the case, there was no doubt that the difference in air strength would become far greater than the difference in naval strength and Japan had, moreover, to expect the ratio to become even less favorable with the passage of time.

On the basis of the above estimate, Japan's Navy operations had to be aimed at dealing a crushing blow to the United States Fleet in the initial stage of the war and thereafter destroying enemy forces wherever they might be found while engaging the enemy fleet in a decisive fight at the earliest time possible. Throughout the operations, moreover, the Navy must constantly whittle the enemy fleet down to prevent the difference in strength from becoming excessively favorable to the enemy.

 

LINK 2

Chapter 1: Japanese Naval Planning

Foreword

This chapter outlines the Japanese Naval Planning for the Pacific War. The material was originally prepared by the Historical Research Department of the Japanese Naval Ministry, under the direction of Captain T. Ohmae, I.J.N., and consisted of answers to specific questions prepared by the Naval Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Further interrogations of Captain Ohmae and other Japanese naval officers were conducted in an effort to clarify specific points, and information obtained has been incorporated in the text.

The Naval Planning Organization

In describing the Japanese war planning organization, the peculiar nature of the Japanese Government must be kept continually in mind. In time of war the Japanese nation, militarily, economically, and politically was completely dominated by the military, the military being itself divided into two independent factions, the Army and the Navy. Although the idea that the Emperor was the supreme head and embodiment of the state was accepted by all, the precise extent of his authority and influence on national policy remained somewhat obscure. All actions, however, were taken in his name, and an Imperial Rescript, such as was issued on 14 August 1945, to terminate the war, had complete authority over the nation. Such being the case, it is important to note that the right of "access to the throne" was enjoyed only by the titular heads of the military services, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the War and Navy Ministers, and that the war powers of both Army and Navy were not subject to control by any other governmental body.

The Government (Cabinet) was dominated by the military in the persons of the War and Navy Ministers, both invariably from the active lists of the Army and Navy. Cabinets fell and were formed at the whim of the military; the resignation of either minister terminated a cabinet and failure of either branch of the services to nominate a minister prevented the formation of a new one.

An equally important point to be borne in mind is that the two factions of the all-powerful military, the Army and the Navy, exercised their authority only through mutual agreements. Unless an agreement was reached between these two factions, nothing could be accomplished.

The Imperial Headquarters, which was created only in time of war for the purpose of assuming supreme military command, was formed in November 1937. Its nucleus was the two general staffs, and it was headed by the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy. As Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, the Emperor was the titular head of this body, though the practical extent of his authority is not clear. What was discussed and agreed upon within this Headquarters was known only to the members. This headquarters was primarily concerned with operational plans, though being the supreme military command body it had great influence on national war policies. Within this headquarters Chief of the Army General Staff determined all matters concerning Army operations, and similarly the Chief of the Naval General Staff determined all matters concerning naval operations. Should there develop a difference of opinion between the two Chiefs, and should agreement not be reached, stalemate and inaction resulted.

The Government (Cabinet) was composed of the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, the Foreign minister and various other ministers. This body was primarily concerned with the economic and political administration of the nation and with the provision of the material and man power for the conduct of the war.

 

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The Supreme War Council was the chief advisory body in formulation of war policies and was composed of members of the Board of Field Marshals and Admirals, the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, and other high officers (including former War and Navy Ministers) appointed by the Emperor. The Imperial Headquarters however had more of a voice in formulating national policies than this unwieldy council. As a result of reverses, the Supreme War Council was superseded in August 1944 by the Supreme Council for the Direction of War. Although the Supreme War Council continued to exist, it retained little power. This Supreme Council for the Direction of War was established primarily to facilitate formulation of fundamental policies for the conduct of the war, and to obtain a national unity in the prosecution of the war. It was not concerned with operational plans, and acted chiefly as a liaison organization between the Imperial Headquarters and the Cabinet. It was composed of six voting regular members: the Prime Minister, the War and Navy Ministers, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy and the Foreign Minister. In addition, the regular members could bring any other minister to a meeting although these latter had no vote. The Deputy Chiefs of Staff also attended but did not vote. On occasion, and by Imperial Order, the President of the Privy Council would attend. When matters of special importance were to be discussed, the Emperor was requested to attend the meetings. There were also occasions when informal meetings were called by the Emperor; this occurred twice in June 1945 when attempts were being made to terminate the war.

During the later stages of the war liaison conferences were held every Tuesday and Friday at the Imperial Palace, but were not attended by the Emperor. Conferees were the Chiefs of Staff, their Deputies, the Chiefs of the 1st Sections (Plans), the Chiefs of the Operations Sections, and other senior officers of the Army and Navy General Staffs. Towards the end of the tenure of office of the Koiso cabinet, these conferences were attended by the prime Minister and the War and Navy ministers. At these conferences operational plans of the Army and Navy, and joint operations were discussed. However, no decisions were made.

Within the Naval General Staff, naval planning was accomplished in the First Section of the First Department, which section was concerned with operational planning. Logistic Planning was done in the Second Department, Naval Intelligence was provided by the Third Department, Communication Planning was done in the Fourth Department, and radio Intelligence was provided by a special section. Naval operations plans originated either in the First Department of the Naval General Staff or in the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet. After discussion by the Chief of the Naval General Staff and the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, the final plans were drawn up. As previously mentioned these operational plans were discussed at the liaison conferences between the Army and Navy. Important plans were discussed at the Imperial General Headquarters and the agreement of the Army General Staff was obtained before the plan was submitted to the Chief of the Naval General staff. If the plan involved participation of the Government in providing necessary material and personnel, steps were taken to obtain the Navy Minister's agreement.

If the contemplated operations were of great importance, the directives were issued in the following manner: For those operations which extended beyond the authority delegated by Imperial Directive to the Chief of the Naval General Staff, the plan was submitted through the Imperial Headquarters to the Emperor for approval, after which it was issued as an order of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters. Directives for plans of lesser importance which did not exceed that authority were issued in the name of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, but by direction of the Naval Staff, Imperial Headquarters.

The Basic Plan for the Greater East Asia War

The Basic Plan as formulated by the Japanese and placed into effect in December 1941, consisted of the following three phases:

 

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• I. The seizure of the Southern Areas which are rich in resources; the attack on the United States Fleet in Hawaii, and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a perimeter for the defense of the Southern Resources Area and the Japanese Mainland. The area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls (including Wake), Bismarcks, Timor, Java, Sumatra, Malaya and Burma.

  II. Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter.

  III. The interception and destruction of any attacking strength which might threaten the defensive perimeter or the vital areas within the perimeter. Concurrently with intercept operations the activation of plans to destroy the United States will to fight.

By the successful accomplishment of the three phases of this plan the Japanese hoped to attain the goal of this war, making Japan self-sufficient.

Upon the successful completion of the first phase, and influenced by the unexpected ease with which their initial operations were carried out, the activation of the second phase was delayed and plans were formulated for further expansion.

These expansion plans were for the purpose of extending Japanese control of the Pacific and provided for the following:

 

• The capture of Port Moresby in order to strengthen the defenses of New Guinea and the Bismarcks.

   

• The capture of Midway in order to strengthen the defenses of the Central Pacific and to force a decisive engagement with the United States Fleet.

   

• The invasion of the Western Aleutians in order to reinforce the defenses of the Northern Area.

   

• The seizure of New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa in order to cut lines of communication between the United States and Australia. This latter step was contingent on the successful completion of the others and was scheduled to be activated subsequent to the capture of Midway.

Upon completion of these expansion operations, the consolidation of position was to be completed as follows:

 

• The Northern Area, June 1942.

   

• The Solomons and Eastern New Guinea Area, November 1942.

   

• The Southern Areas, January 1943.

   

• General consolidation of all occupied areas, March 1943.

Supporting Plans

In support of the basic plan, plans were formulated for the conduct of the following operations:

 

• Raids on advanced Allied bases.-- These operations were for the purpose of preventing the strengthening of Allied positions as operational bases.

   

  Air raid on Port Darwin. This was carried out on 19 February 1942.

   

  Air raid on Ceylon. Raids by carrier forces were carried out on 4 and 13 April 1942.

   

  Air raids on Hawaii. These were to be conducted by seaplanes refueling from submarines at French Frigate Shoals and if possible by land based planes operating from Midway subsequent to its capture.

   

  Raids on Diego Suarez and Sidney by midget submarines. These were carried out on 31 May 1942.

  Every effort was to be made and every opportunity seized to reduce Allied air and surface strength by raiding tactics.

 

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• Operations Against Allied Lines of Communication.-- The Japanese expected to accomplish much through the use of German submarine blockade tactics, and plans were made to employ such tactics in teh Pacific and Indian Oceans. Carrier and land based aircraft were to be employed whenever possible against lines of communication. They also planned to operate auxiliary cruisers in the Southern Pacific and East Indian oceans at the outbreak of the war.

   

• Operations for the Protection of Japanese Lines of Communication.-- Until about the end of 1942 shipping losses were comparatively light and no comprehensive plans for the protection of shipping were in effect. With the sudden rise in shipping losses the following countermeasures were taken to protect their lines of communications:

   

  Convoy operations were organized and a system of shipping control established.

   

  Surface escort units were organized and additional escort vessels provided.

   

  Antisubmarine patrols were activated and search and reconnaissance operations increased. A refuge policy for shipping was established.

   

  Small type vessels were employed for transportation in advanced areas.

   

  Development of improved antisubmarine weapons and the training of personnel in antisubmarine warfare were undertaken.

   

• Air Defense Operations in the Home Islands.-- Although this was an Army responsibility, the Japanese Navy acted in as assisting capacity. Air defense plans provided for the following:

   

  Employment of concentration in the use of intercept fighters.

   

  Installation of antiaircraft batteries in the vicinity of metropolitan and industrial areas.

   

  Installation of radar at strategic points.

   

  Stationing of patrol vessels to the east and south of the Home Islands.

   

  Improvement of fighter performance; research toward development of improved types.

   

  Measures for the dispersal and removal to underground installations of industrial activities, and the evacuation of industrial areas.

   

  Strenghtening of air defense organizations.

Japanese Comments on the Basic Plan

In commenting on the Basic Plan and upon the implementation of this plan the Japanese made the following comments and expressions of opinions. Several of the senior Naval officers interrogated stated that even the original perimeter was perhaps too extended to be maintained with the military potential available. They further felt that they failed properly to estimate their military and economic requirements for the war, and that they had particularly underestimated the economic potential of the United States and the United States will to fight.

The unexpected success of the operations in the first phase, and the ease with which these oprations were carried out, caused the Japanese to underestimate the existing United States strength and to embark on a further expansion. This policy of further expansion was hotly debated; however the faction in favor of pushing the initial advantages won out. The air raid on Tokyo on 18 April 1942had some influence on this decision in that it tended to confirm the need for additional bases to the east. As they stated, the reserve strength which should have been used in consolidating the positions seized in the initial phase was dissipated in the unsuccessful attempts at further expansion. In view of the limitations of Japnese miltiary strength, shipping, and the national economy, this attempt to expand an already too big strategic sphere brought about unsolvable problems. At the time when the defenses of those areas which had to be held at any cost were left wanting, operations for the capture of port Moresby, Midway, and the Aleutinas were undertaken, thereby further dissipating the nation's strength. Thus it was conceded that the expansion program which was intended to strengthen the Japanese defense position actually weakened it. All the

 

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Japanese interrogated on this subject considered that this expansion was a fundamental error in the conduct of the war.

The losses sustained in these unsuccessful attempts at expansion beyond the original outlined perimeter proved to be the greatest handicap in carrying out subsequent naval operations. It was stated that the loss of a major portion of their carriers in these operations was a serious blow to their naval air strength and, after still further air losses during the Solomons Campaign, the Japanese Naval Air Force never fully recovered.

When the Japanese were forced to return to their original plan of consolidation, it was with greatly reduced strength. Although priority was given to the construction of carriers and the strengthening of their air forces, they stated that they were unable to match the speed of the United States counteroffensives, and that they were continually behind schedule in the building up of defenses and the training of their air forces.

Comments on Supporting Plans, Their Concept and Execution

Japanese opinions regarding the concept and execution of supporting plans obtained in interrogations are summarized below.

 

• Raids on advanced Allied bases.-- As could be expected from their military ideology of the offense, the Japanese considered that operations of this nature would be of great value and gave them high priority. In the early stages of the war, these raids were quite successful, particularly those carried out by carrier forces.

  After the Battle of Midway, in which the Japanese carrier forces sustained such heavy losses, most of the strength which they could muster had to be used in the attempts to counter United States offensive operations. Thus after the early raids, Japanese carrier forces were unable to continue these operations against Allied bases. With their carrier forces reduced to relative impotence, the Japanese attempted with small success to conduct raids using land-based air forces. United States opposition increased at every point while the training and quality of Japanese air forces declined steadily. Toward the end of the war, the chief Japanese hope seemed to lie in raids against United States advanced bases by special attack (Kamikaze) forces. Such raids on anchorages were carried out by submarine-borne "human torpedoes" in early 1945, and by a special attack force of airplanes on Ulithi in March 1945. Again they were not considered highly successful, although abortive attempts were made to repeat the latter.

  The Japanese in analyzing these raiding tactics, felt that they started too late to originate and to prepare and train for that type of operation -- the use of suicide tactics of all types. They continue to feel that, had adequate advance preparations been made and the inherent spirit of the special suicide attack been fully utilized, these tactics perhaps would have reversed the tide of battle.

   

• Operations against Allied Lines of sea communications.-- Although some results were obtained from the outbreak of the war until about the time of the Guadalcanal battles, submarines, which would have been the greatest threat to our sea communications, were largely employed in the defense of vital areas, in supply operations to bypassed bases, and in tactical support of fleet operations. Hence only a small force of submarines was employed against Allied shipping, and due to the effectiveness of the United States antisubmarine measures these operations were confined to such areas as the Indian ocean.

  As regards surface raiders, very little preparation and training was carried out before the war and the results obtained by these forces were very slight.

   

• Operations for the protection of Japanese line of communications.-- They Japanese were quite frank in condemning their failure to protect their lines of communications. They felt that as a whole their military ideology placed too much emphasis on offensive operations, leaving much to be desired

 

--5--

 

• in the study and planning for such purely defensive operations as protection of surface shipping. Moreover since shipping losses were comparatively light during the first year of the war, no consideration was given to developing and improving tactics for this type of operation. Therefore, by the time that losses took an alarming aspect, the Japanese were behind in the development of countermeasures and continued to fall farther behind as the attacks against shipping were accelerated. In retrospect they felt that, since the basic objective of the war was to obtain for Japan the resources in the southern area, maintaining the security of the sea lanes between these resources and the industrial homeland should have been considered an integral part of the basic war plans. Inability to maintain the security of these sea lanes had a vital effect on her ability to sustain her war industries.

   

• Air defense operations in the Home Islands.-- By the time air attacks began against the home islands, the Japanese fighter defense was inadequate to meet these attacks. As a result of losses sustained in prior operations and the continuing attrition, the defense was inadequate in both numbers and performance. Although attempts to obtain improved types were made, the planes did not materialize.

  As a result of heavy losses suffered in combat prior to the threat of major air attacks on her homeland, a large part of her effective fighter strength had been destroyed. Lack of aviation gasoline and the need for conserving their remaining strength for the defense against invasion, resulted in orders to disperse or conserve the remaining fighter strength.

  The dispersal and moving underground of essential industries, as well as the evacuation of the metropolitan areas, were not effected until it was too late.

Operational Plans Formulated Throughout the War

After the failures at Port Moresby and Midway in May and June 1942 Japan attempted to consolidate the occupied areas in accordance with the original basic plan. Defenses in general were to be strengthened in the Western Aleutians, Ogasawara, Wake, Marsh, Gilberts, Bismarcks, New Guinea, and the entire southern occupied area. The areas to be held at all costs were the Southern Resources Area, and the area to the westward of a line joining the Kuriles, Marianas, and Carolines. In March 1943, in view of the unfavorable outlook in the Solomons and Eastern New Guinea, these areas were removed from the vital area and only delaying operations were to be undertaken there.

Operational plans for defending the vital areas and the defensive perimeter were prepared. The objective of these plans was to defend these areas, to destroy United States forces which attempted to attack the defense perimeter, to cut United States lines of communication, and to establish a strategically strong position. In support of these plans every effort was to be made to build up naval air forces, both carrier and land-based.

In order to achieve this purpose, the following operational tasks were to be performed:

 

• Establishment of a strategically strong position based on air power.

   

• Destruction of the United States Fleet based in advanced positions or after enticing it into action under conditions favorable to the Japanese; invasion and destruction of positions which were strategically important, thus forcing abandonment of any offensive operations before they could be activated.

   

• Swift consolidation of secured areas, so that any attempt to counterattack could be repulsed through close cooperation between air and sea power.

   

• Increase in commerce raiding operations so as to prevent reinforcement in men and supplies.

   

• Increase in protection of the Japanese lines of communication.

In accordance with the foregoing, and in cooperation with the Army, a speedy strengthening of defenses was attempted. However the carrying out of this task was beyond Japanese capabilities.

The "Z" Operation Plan (formulated about May 1943)

 

--6--

The operational policy of this plan was:

 

• To establish a front line of defense along the line joining the Aleutians, Wake, Marshalls, Gilberts, Nauru, Ocean, and the Bismarcks, and to strengthen the principle positions along this defense line, with local commanders responsible for countermeasures against any attacks against this line. The Combined Fleet was to stand by in the vicinity of Truk.

   

• In the event of attack, to draw the attacking force toward the principle positions and to destroy it by the joint action of land-based air and mobile attack tactics of the carrier striking force.

   

• To conduct raids against United States carriers in order to reduce their power.

The tasks to be performed were as follows:

 

• Maintenance of a strict watch on the main strength of the United States Fleet by submarine reconnaissance.

   

• Search and reconnaissance by land-based aircraft.

   

• Reduction of enemy strength by destructive raiding of advanced enemy bases.

   

• Upon receipt of reports of contact with enemy forces, the Mobile Fleet was to sortie without delay and, operating in close cooperation with land-based air and submarine forces, destroy first the enemy carriers and, second, the transports.

   

• Garrison forces at the point of enemy attack were to endeavor to destroy the enemy at the shore line. If, however, the enemy succeeded in forcing a landing, local forces were to counterattack persistently in an effort to delay the enemy as long as possible and to prevent the establishment of bases.

 

• Naval Surface Forces

   

  In the Truk-Marshalls-Gilberts area: local naval forces of the 4th Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 14 and several destroyers.

   

  In the Bismarck-Solomons area: local naval forces of the 8th Fleet consisting of Destroyer Squadron 3.

   

  At Truk: main strength of the Combined Fleet consisting of Battleship Division 1; Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, 7, and 8; Carrier Division 3 (Air Flotillas 1 and 2); Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 4; and Submarine Squadrons 1 and 3.

   

• Naval Air Forces

   

  In the Marshalls area: Air Flotilla 22.

   

  In the Truk-Bismarcks-Solomons area: 11th Air Fleet consisting of Air Flotillas 25 and 26, plus two Air Groups.

  As a result of the Munda and Kolombangara landings and the landings at Lae and Salamaua, it became apparent that Rabaul could no longer be considered an effective position. Therefore, at the end of September 1943, the defense line was withdrawn and the vital area was reduced to that within the line Kuriles-Marianas-Carolines, and the Sumatra-Java-Timor line. Efforts were then concentrated on the strengthening of these areas and on sending reinforcements. But due to the lack of shipping the desired results were not achieved.

  The United States occupation of the Gilberts and Marshalls was resisted with only inadequate land-based air and local garrisons. As these areas had been removed from the vital area in September 1943, the Combined Fleet was not committed. A further reason for not committing the fleet was that, as a result heavy losses sustained by the carrier air groups at Midway and in the Solomons, the carrier divisions were not ready for operations. The "Z" plan, in modified form, remained in effect until May 1944, when it was cancelled and superseded by the "A" plans.

   

  --7--

  The "Y" Operations Plan (formulated about May 1943)

  The operational policy and tasks for this plan were similar to those for the contemporary "Z" Plan, except for the area of operations. The front line of defense prescribed in this plan was that joining the Andamans, Nicobar, Sumatra, Java, and Timor. In case this defense line alone was threatened, the main strength of the Combined Fleet was to be moved to the Philippines or to Singapore. In case this defense line was threatened and the "Z" Plan also activated, then only a portion of the carrier force was to be utilized, together with local forces available.

  The position of forces prescribed by this plan was:

   

  Naval Surface Forces -- There were available only minor units in small numbers as local naval forces in this area. These were attached to the Southwest Area Fleet at Singapore, and to the 2d, 3d, and 4th Southern Expeditionary Fleets at Surabaya, Manila, and Amboina respectively.

   

  Naval Air Forces -- The main strength of Air Flotilla 23 was in the Celebes area; the remainder was in Manila and Northern Sumatra. After September 1943, the 13th Air Fleet (Air Flotillas 23 and 28) was similarly deployed.

  The "A" Operations Plan (formulated May 1944)

  At the end of February 1944, the Gilberts and Marshalls had been occupied and Truk and the Bismarcks neutralized and bypassed. The outer defense was then further withdrawn to the Marianas, Palau, and the Sumatra-Java-Timor-Western New Guinea line. The "A" plan was drawn up for a decisive action in defense of this line. Force necessary for this operation were expected to be ready the latter part of May 1944.

  The objective of this plan was to concentrate all available forces for a decisive action against United States attack forces.

  The tasks to be performed were as follows:

   

  Consolidation of decisive battle forces was to be expedited. The enemy fleet's main force was to be contacted and destroyed sometime subsequent to the latter part of May, in the general area between the Central Pacific and the Philippines, or in the area south of the Timor-Java-Sumatra line. Unless otherwise directed, participation in any decisive action prior to the time when the forces could be thoroughly organized was to be avoided. Insofar as possible, the seas close to the bases where the Mobile Fleet was based were to be selected as the scene for the decisive battle.

   

  In the event that the enemy's attack materialized prior to the time of completion of the organization of the Mobile Fleet, decisive action employing naval surface forces was to be avoided and land-based air and local defense forces would be employed in intercepting and destroying the attacking force. In this eventuality every effort was to be made to avoid excessive losses of shore-based air, except where such losses would have a favorable effect on the ensuing decisive action.

   

  At the opportune moment when preparations for the decisive action had been completed, the entire force was to be thrown against the enemy's main strength in an effort to contact and destroy it.

   

  In preparation for the decisive action, priority was to be given to preparations for air operations by construction of air bases and by stockpiling of fuel and ammunition. The Army and Navy were to cooperate in these preparations, and share all air bases jointly.

  The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

   

  Naval Surface Forces: The forces of the First Mobile Fleet, consisting of Battleship Division 1 and 3, Carrier Divisions 1, 2, and 3, Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, and 7, and Destroyer Squadrons 2 and 10, were to stand by in the Central and Southern Philippines.

   

  --8--

   

   

  Naval Air Forces: The First Air Fleet, consisting of Air Flotillas 61 and 62, was to be deployed in the Central Pacific (Marianas-Western Carolines), Philippines, and the area north of Australia.

  The preparations for the decisive action under this plan were never completed as planned and the training of the air force, particularly the carrier air groups, was behind schedule. The Japanese considered that the carrier air groups would be ready in August. In view of the United States carrier strike on Palau in the latter part of March 1944, and the occupation of Hollandia in April, the Japanese estimated that the next attack would be against Palau, which also was a scene of action favorable to their plan.

  However, when United States forces appeared off Saipan in June and initiated their assault the "A" plan was activated even though complete preparations had not been realized. In the ensuing battle of the Philippine Sea, the major portion of their carriers and practically all of the carrier air groups were lost. In addition the shore-based First Air Fleet suffered severe losses. These losses to the Japanese Naval Air Force vitally affected all subsequent operations, and the prospect of success in future operations at sea became very dim.

  The "Sho" Operations Plan (formulated in July 1944)

  After the fall of the Marianas, and as a result of the heavy losses sustained in that campaign, the Japanese considered that any attempt to recapture these islands was out of the question. The United States had obtained control of the Central Pacific areas. This again forced the Japanese to further withdraw their defense line to one running from the Home Islands through the Nansei Shoto, Formosa, Philippines, and Timor-Java-Sumatra. The "Sho" plan was drawn up for a decisive action in defense of this line, with the probability that it would take place in the vicinity of the Home Islands, Nansei Shoto, Formosa or Philippines. The Nanpo Shoto was also considered as a possible scene of action. The next attack was expected some time after August 1944.

  The operational policy of this plan was:

   

  By means of an all-out coordinated effort of land, sea, and air forces, to fight a decisive action in defense of the Home Islands, Nansei Shoto, Formosa, and Philippine areas. Only under favorable conditions would a decisive action be fought in defense of the Nanpo Shoto.

  In accordance with the estimate of the probable areas of action, and in order to facilitate preparations and to establish command relationships the following four plans were drawn up:

  Sho Number 1--Philippine Area.

  Sho Number 2--Formosa-Nansei Shoto-Southern Kyushu Areas.

  Sho Number 3--Kyushu-Shikoku-Honshu Areas.

  Sho Number 4--Hokkaido Area.

  As the Sho Number and 1 and Number 2 were considered most likely to be activated, priority was given to strengthening the defenses in these areas. After a brisk discussion between the Army and Navy, it was agreed that an all-out land defense would be made only if the action were to occur in the Northern Philippines. If the action were to occur in the central or southern part, only air and surface forces would seek decisive action.

  The tasks to be performed were:

   

  Destruction of enemy forces at the point of attack, by air, sea, and land forces concentrating on carriers and transports. The primary target fo the Naval air forces was to be the United States Carrier Task Force; for Army air forces, the convoys.

   

  Disposition of air strength in depth, and conservation of this strength until just before the attempt to land.

   

  --9--

   

   

  All-out air attacks and surface torpedo attacks when the enemy fleet and convoys approached sufficiently close to the objective.

   

  Maintenance of a counter landing force in readiness; to counter landing if a favorable opportunity occurs.

  The initial disposition of forces prescribed by this plan:

   

  Naval Surface Forces

   

  Inland Sea area: The 3d Fleet, consisting of Carrier Divisions 1, 3 and 4, and Destroyer Squadrons 10 and 11; the 6th Fleet consisting of Submarine Squadrons 7, 8, and 11, plus Battleship Division 2 of the 2d Fleet.

   

  Ominato area: The 5th Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 21 and Destroyer Squadron 1.

   

  Philippines area: Southwest Area Fleet consisting of Cruiser Division 16 plus some destroyers.

   

  Singapore area: The 2d Fleet consisting of Battleship Divisions 1 and 3, Cruiser Divisions 4, 5, and 7, and Destroyer Squadron 2, plus one half of Destroyer Squadron 10.

   

  Army and Navy Air Forces

   

  Northeast and Home Islands area: Army, the 1st, 10th, 11th, and 12th Air Divisions plus Training Command Aircraft; Navy, the 3d and 12th Air Fleets plus Air Groups of the 3d Fleet.

   

  Nansei Shoto-Formosa areas: The Army 8th Air Division and the Navy 2d Air Fleet (this air fleet was later sent to the Philippines).

   

  Philippines-Area North of Australia: The Army 4th Air Army and the Navy 1st Air Fleet.

  Palau and Morotai were attacked in September, the Japanese estimated that the next move would be against the Philippines so no changes were made in the "Sho" plan. When in October the attacks did occur on the Central Philippines, the "Sho" plan was activated and, in accordance therewith, the Fleet was committed and reinforcements were dispatched to Leyte.

  The Battle for Leyte Gulf was a complete defeat for the Japanese Fleet. In it the major portion of the remaining Japanese naval surface strength was destroyed. In addition the Army and Navy air forces in the Philippines suffered severe losses. This campaign also saw the initiation of special attack (Kamikaze) tactics.

  The "Ten" Operation Plan (formulated in early March 1945)

  With the occupation of the Central Philippines and the establishment of United States air bases in this area, the final severance of lines of communication between Japan and her vital resources was accomplished. The Japanese estimated that United States strategic plans were aimed at positions surrounding the China Sea, with the most probable objective being in the Nansei Shoto. With operations continuing throughout the Philippines, the Japanese did not expect that Formosa would be attacked. The "Ten" plan was formulated for the final defense of an inner line established through the Home Islands, the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and the South coast of China. With the Japanese fleet almost completely destroyed and the air force reduced to the employment of suicide tactics, a "decisive action" was no longer possible and only a "last ditch" defense was contemplated.

  The operational policy for this plan was:

   

  To hold out in the Nansei Shoto, Formosa and Shanghai areas.

   

  In the event a hopeless situation arose, to make the enemy losses as heavy as possible and to delay the development of air bases to the utmost.

   

  --10--

   

   

  During this period further preparations were to be made for the final defense of the Home Islands.

  In order to facilitate defense preparations in the probable objective areas, and to establish command relationships, the following four plans were drawn up:

  Ten Number 1--Nansei Shoto-Formosa area.

  Ten Number 2--Formosa.

  Ten Number 3--Formosa-East and South coasts of China.

  Ten Number 4--Hainan and areas to the westward.

  The tasks to be performed were:

   

  To combine and concentrate the major portion of Army and Navy air strength, and to deploy these forces in the Kyushu-Nansei Shoto area.

   

  To use the major portion of this combined air strength in special attack (Kamikaze) tactics.

   

  To meet the attacking forces with the entire strength of the aerial special attack force with the object of destroying it. The Naval air force was to consider the destruction of enemy carriers as the primary objective.

   

  When favorable opportunities arose, the use of surface forces was to be considered.

   

  No preparations were to be made for the training of surface counter landing forces.

  The disposition of forces prescribed by this plan was:

   

  Naval Surface Forces: Only remnants of the Combined Fleet remained in the Inland Sea consisting of Battleship Divisions 1 and 3, Carrier Division 1 and 4, three destroyer squadrons, about 30 submarines, and a few cruisers. Most units were under repair. No trained air groups were available for carriers.

   

  Air Forces:

   

  Home Islands area (including Nansei Shoto): Army, 6th Air Army; Navy 3d, 5th and 10 Air Fleets.

   

  Formosa: Army, 8th Air Division; Navy, 1st Air Fleet.

   

  Southwest Area: Army, 3d Air Army; Navy, 13th Air Fleet.

   

  China: 5th Air Army.

  In accordance with plans Iwo Jima was defended only by limited operations of naval land-based air forces. However the United States amphibious assault on Okinawa was opposed by large-scale suicide attacks and a desperate suicide sortie by the battleship Yamato with an escort of light vessels. Heavy losses were suffered by the remnants of the Japanese Army and Navy Air Forces.

  The "Ketsu" Operation Plan (formulated at the end of March, 1945)

  With the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the last line of defense was broken; the air and sea blockade of the Home Islands was complete. The next projected advance of the United States forces was obviously the invasion of the Home Islands with the Southern Kyushu and the Kanto area the most probable objectives. The "Ketsu" plan was drawn up for the final defense of the Empire.

  The operational policy for this plan was:

   

  To use the concentrated strength of all forces in an effort to smash the advancing United States forces. Strong, quick, and decisive operations were to be carried out to the bitter end.

   

  To make every effort to strengthen the defenses of the vital areas.

  The tasks to be performed were:

   

  Strengthening of vital invasion points, and important straits and bay entrances. Steps were taken to guarantee security of surface communications.

   

  --11--

   

   

  Mobilization and concentration of all mobile forces, particularly air and suicide attack strength, in order that enemy forces could be successfully counterattack while enroute to invasion points.

   

  To conduct all types of suicide attacks against enemy convoys, both at sea and when close to land.

   

  In anticipation of large-scale air raids, to take every possible measure to preserve and increase combat strength. Strong measures were to be taken to make appropriate disposition of military supplies and to expedite dispersal and evacuation of establishments.

   

  Every means was to be employed to give full play to the united combat strength of the Army and Navy air arms. The Army and Navy air forces were to make joint use of bases, and maintenance and logistic supplies were to be interchanged.

   

  Prior to activation of these plans, antiair and antisubmarine operations were to be accelerated.

   

  Raids with the object of neutralizing enemy air bases in the Marianas, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa were to be carried out.

  The disposition of forces was:

   

  Naval Surface Forces: All remaining naval surface forces were scattered among bases in home waters, the major portion being at Kure. Except for personnel of AA guns, most of the personnel has been assigned to various types of suicide operations.

   

  Air Forces: All the remaining air strength of the Army and Navy, including training planes, was assigned for an all-out defense against invasion. The greater proportion of these planes were suicide planes. The Army Air Force, consisting of the 1st, 5th and 6th Air Armies, had approximately 3,200 planes of all types. The Navy Air Fleets with various Air Flotillas, could muster approximately 5,200 planes of all types. These planes were disposed throughout all the Home Islands and in Korea and China.

  Preparations for these operations were considerably disorganized by increasingly heavy United States raids by land-based and carrier-based planes. Attacks preliminary to the invasion were being systematically conducted against all of the Home Island by Allied carrier forces. These attacks included shore bombardment by heavy ships and shipping sweeps of coastal waters by light surface forces.

  The Imperial Rescript of 14 August 1945 terminated hostilities, and on 2 September 1945 the surrender terms were executed.

 

Link 3

ABC 4

JCCSs- 1

December 24, 1941.

THE CHIEFS OF STAFF CONFERENCE

FEDERAL RESERVE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, D. C.

10:30 A.M., DECEMBER 24, 1941

Present

British Officers

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, .First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff

Field Marshal Sir John hill

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff

Admiral Sir Charles Little, JointStaff Mission

Lieut. General Sir Colv. ille Wemyss, Joint Staff Mission

Air Marshal A. T. Harris, Joint Staff Mission

U. S. Naval Officers

Admiral H. R. Stark Chief of Naval Operations

Admiral E. J. King, Commander-.in-Chief., U. S..Fleet

Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton President of the General Board Rear Admiral F. H. Horne, Assistant

Chief of Naval Operations Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, Chief Bureau of Aeronautics

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director, War Plans Division

Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant

U.S. Marine Corps U. S. Army Officers

General George C. Marshall, Commanding General of the Field Forces and Chief of Staff U.S. Army

Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Chief of Army Air .Forces and Deputy Chief of Staff U. S. Army

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow., Chief of War Plans Div ision

 

Link 4

U. S SERIAL ABC-4/CS-1

BRITISH SERIAL W.W.-1 (FINAL)

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WASHINGTON WAR CONFERENCE AMERICAN-BRITISH STRATEGY MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED STATES AND BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF NOTE: The circulation of this paper should be restricted to the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and their immediate subordinates I. GRAND STRATEGY

1. At thp. A-B* Staff conversations in February, 1941, it was agreed that Germany was the predominant member of the Axis Powers and consequently the Atlantic and European area was considered to be the decisive theatre.

2. Much has happened since February last, but notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated, the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow.

3. In our considered opinion therefore, it should be a cardinal principle of A-B strategy that only the minimum of force necessary for the safe-guarding of vital interests in other theatres should be diverted from operations against Germany.

II. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF OUR STRATEGY

4. The essential features of the above grandstrategy are as follows. Each will be examined in greater detail later in this paper.

a. The realization of the victory programme of armaments, which first and foremost requires the security of the main areas of war industry.

Note: For brevity the abbreviated A-B is used to denote American British

 

Link 5

U S. SERIAL ABC-4/3

BRITISH SERIAL WW(J.P.C ) 3. December 28, 1941

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE REPORT TO CHIEFS OF STAFF SUPPORTING MEASURES FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC (THE FAR EAST AREA AND ADJACENT BEGIONS)

DIRECTIVE

1. CHIEFS OF STAFF DIRECTIVE TO THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE.

Until such timeas the wider problem of the unified control of all available forces in the Southwest Pacific Area is solved the aim must be to reinforce the Philippine Islands Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies to the maximum extent, and to make the best possible arrangements for ensuring the safe arrival and the most effective intervention of these reinforcements. Having regard to the existing situation in the Far East and the Southwest Pacific, the Joint Planning Committee is asked to make recommendations as to the disposition of the reinforcements particularly air forces, expected to be available in the Southwest Pacific Area on:-

a. 15th January. 1942.

b. Ist February. 1942.

on the following alternative assumptions:-

(1) The Philippines and Singapore both hold.

(2) Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies hold, but the Philippines do not.

(3) Neither Singapore nor the Philippines holds.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2. Our basic strategic concept is to maintain initially the strategic defensive in the Southwest Pacific Theatre. The present strength